Sunday, 13 December 2009
President Zardari alone is not responsible for perils faced by the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) today. Being the president of a country his personal problems are now hampering the progress of Pakistan. The problems are growing with the time and it appears to be consuming most of his waking time in meetings with so called friends and allies or political partners - time that he should rather spend on betterment of people of Pakistan who are stuck in a country where the quality of rulers seems to be dwindling with each successive government as Father of the Nation Mohammad Ali Jinnah predicted before his death in 1948.
But could Zardari alone be held responsible for the current plight of PPP or does the entire PPP leadership carry the blame? There is no doubt that luck played a big part in Zardari’s ascent to power. It clearly was a very difficult period in PPP’s history after the party was left devastated by the loss of its all powerful leader, Benazir Bhutto . Also there is this traditional style of ascent to political leadership in the subcontinent where a single person becomes the face of the party without whom nothing seems to matter.
For this reason the senior party leadership thought that they needed a figurehead in the form of Zardari, being father of Benazir's children, to carry on that legacy. This was understandable logic at the time but the leadership had a much bigger and wider role to play.
The party leadership should have been able to see outside the box and should have able to imagine the ramifications of Zardari’s candidacy which they approved on his flimsy evidence. Evidence that Mr Zardari refused to share with the public to whom they owe everything, who have made them the “leaders” they are.
The traditional style of thinking and jumping on the band wagon without proper assessment would have normally worked in Pakistan only if the candidate in question was a normal first husband. The man in question was, however, no other but Mr Zardari and the party leadership failed to recognise the extent of the baggage he carried and his capacity to be ever able to emerge from those shadows.
The PPP Central Executive Committee was witness to the fall of its government on two occasions and on either occasion Zardari’s corruption was blamed for it. It is only fair to expect from members of CEC that they would have been capable of such risk assessment and its management. They failed dismally on both counts.
Before making a decision on a new party leader the senior leadership should have carried out wider discussions over many days involving all stake holders instead of a two hours meeting just two days after the death of a cult like personality Benazir Bhutto.
The question in consideration should have been that in Pakistan where a party chairman is a supposed to be a visionary personality who leads his/her party to success and glory wcould Zardari be that person or would he become a liability for the party because of his past and that whether that damage would be sustainable.
Secondly once they had agreed to his ascent to power there should have been a comprehensive strategy development exercise aimed at enhancing his stature to such a point that effortlessly appeared convincing to the masses. This should have been possible by putting together a governing team without a blemish on their character that executed political programme that uplifted the lives of masses.
Quite to the contrary the party made mistakes after mistakes refusing to accept the consequences. The party somehow convinced itself that as they had accepted Zardari so will the masses and all other stake holders. They failed again to recognise that whereas they had a personal interests in selecting him but other stakeholders did not. And to be fair to other stakeholders including Pakistani public, PPP political allied parties, opposition parties, judiciary, agitating lawyers, establishment and media time and again gave Zardari and the PPP benefit of the doubt. But time and again Mr Zardari faled all of them by breaking political promises and agreements.
The CEC, that “expressed full confidence in Mr Zardari” after each political disaster, should have foreseen the consequences that such behaviour invited and should have stood up to his style of governance. As Mr Zardari’s political behaviour became more and more erratic and unpredictable the CEC only concerned itself to repeatedly reposing its trust in him leaving people shocked and hopeless.
Mr Zardari somehow believed once ratified by CEC all his wrongs will become right. No dissenting voice was heard in public apart from rare few who didn’t matter anyway as Zardari had isolated them. Although the CEC looked after Mr Zardari’s interests they showed a blatant disregard for the interests of PPP workers, its supporters and its electorate. CEC failed in its primary function to ensure that the collective decisions were in the interests of the party, its supporters and most of all Pakistan. One wonders how do a group of such individuals, who repeatedly and deliberately fail in their sacred responsibility of looking after the interests of millions, live with their conscience on daily basis. How do they fail
repeatedly not to recognise right from wrong? How do they not feel guilty by always giving in to such demands and not thinking of the impact of such decisions on scores of people? How dare they insult the intelligence of Pakistani public by endlessly arguing in favour of their repeated betrayals of Pakistan and its public on electronic media rather than hiding behind walls. For it is Pakistan that made them who they are today and without it although they might have palaces in different countries around the world but will have no identity.
PArty leadership's decision about Zardari leadership has seriously wounded the party and it is now time for the CEC to make its mark. The senior leadership needs to come out of Zardari’s shadows and play an active role in steering the country out of this situation. Without further delay they need to strongly support and implement some long awaited and popular demands like the restoration of constitution, rationalising the cabinet and take strong measures against corruption.
If Zardari is stubborn enough to continue to disregard the senior leadership and treat them like hired managers of a private business then they need to reflect that rather than humiliating themselves on daily basis by making vain attempts to justify his selfish blunders is it worthwhile to resign from CEC and live like decent men with their heads high rather than govern with a bleeding conscience.
Wednesday, 25 November 2009
Pakistani youth involved in writing of "The Next Generation" report by the British Council were asked to create a manifesto for their generation listing the goals they beleived young Pakistnis should set themselves and their peers in the pursuit of positive change for Pakistan. A group of young people from my home town Lahore came with the following manifesto:
- Zero tolerance towards corruption.
- Thou shall judge your fellow human beings based on nothing but his/her merit.
- Teach Pakistan, server Pakistan. I pledge to spend at least 4 hours per month for 5 years teaching in community service.
- I shall read at least one book a year that is in direct conflict with my belief.
- I will not discriminate.
- I pledge to accept all my mistakes instead of justifying them.
- I will not be a second-class citizen in my own country and not compromise Pakistan and its sovereignty while doing so.
Hope is not lost, yet!
With more young people ready to join the work force and engage in making a difference Pakistani leadership has an opportunity to turn this into an economic development opportunity.
This demographic dividend first became available in the 1990s. The window of opportunity will close around 2045, by which time the society will be ageing rapidly. During this period, therefore, investment in the next generation will have a huge impact on Pakistan's long term prospects. The dividend doesn't come for free. It has to be earned.Pakistan needs to educate its youth and make sure they are healthy; find them jobs as they get older and provide them with opportunities to save; and offer them ways of expressing their desire for social and political change.
Young people offer great promise for Pakistan's future, but only if they are equipped to lead productive, engaged and fulfilling lives. At present, this generation is in grave peril. It is starved of education and opportunities, and vulnerable to manipulation by those who do not have its best interests at heart. This [younger] generation is at a crossroads. Starved of opportunity, it feels bottled up and frustrated, trapped in a world where only the wealthy and the well-connected thrive. While few believe violence is justified, many understand its causes, believing that injustice and poor economic conditions are fuelling social unrest and terror.According to the survey main areas of concern for young people in Pakistan are:
Economic survival: 72% of young people believe that their personal economic situation has got worse in the past year. Only one in ten are hopeful for things to get better in the near future. Of course, they are worried about terrorism and the security situation, but their main worries are day-to-day survival
Lack of trust in political leadership:
Disillusion with democracy is pronounced. Only around 10% have a great deal of confidence in national or local government, the courts, or the police. Only 39% voted in the last election; while half are not even on the voters' list.Many in the media would like to read it as a vote of no confidence in President Zardari but that would be unfair. Young people are disillusioned by political elite in the country - not just by one political party or one individual. The political class is seen as selfish and corrupt:
“Politicians are busy in their own fighting and no one even cares or bothers". Many in the next generation do not believe Pakistan's leaders really want the country to change. And although they have ideas about the future, the next generation are convinced nobody is listening.
Trust in military and religion: Trust in the courts, police and local government is severely depleted, while only the military is widely trusted. This should be taken as a vote of confidence in Pakistan army as an institution - a sign that while general public despises General Musharraf's regime, Army has been able to re-establish its credibility at the most crucial time in our history.
Hunger for self expression:
Young people feel they have few platforms from where they can express themselves, while a failure to enforce basic civil liberties means that few young Pakistanis feel able to campaign for change. The next generation needs opportunities to express itself politically and to participate in building a cohesive society. Frustrate its ambitions or waste its energy, and you have a recipe for social failure and disruption.Education:
The violence that has plagued Pakistan in recent times deters young people from attending school, going to work and socialising with their peers. It is a major impediment in achieving their goals. An overriding priority must be to expand access to education. The experience of other countries shows that rapid progress is possible, given political will, adequate funding, and effective delivery. Though the government is now committed to increasing expenditure on education to 7% of GDP by 2015, through its new National education Policy the Ministry of Education struggles to spend its current funding allocation highlighting issues with capacity for delivery.
Due to a lack of proper planning nearly twenty years of the [demographic] dividend have already been wasted...Time is running out to put appropriate policies in place...the absence of which may result in large scale unemployment and immense pressure on health and education systems. In short, a socio-economic crisis may take place, making the demographic dividend more of a demographicThe report acknowledges that the international community has failed Pakistan, while pursuing a myopic and narrow minded agenda that has not delivered any tangible improvement in the security of ordinary people.
Pakistan risks falling prey to a worsening cycle of poverty, polarisation and conflict, at a time when the population continues to increase rapidly and growing numbers of Pakistanis hunger for a better life. Demographic challenges place Pakistan at a crossroads. Action taken today will have an impact for a generation or more. Conversely, the country will reap the consequences of failure for decades to come."
It is heartening to note that despite their growing frustration, young people still love their country, with a majority believing it is the best country in the world to live in.
Monday, 9 November 2009
The principal fear is mutiny — that extremists inside the Pakistani military might stage a coup, take control of some nuclear assets, or even divert a warhead.Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee of Pakistan Army General Tariq Majid objected:
We have operationalised a very effective nuclear security regime which incorporates very stringent custodial and access controls...as overall custodian of the development of our strategic programme, I reiterate in very unambiguous terms that there is absolutely no question of sharing or allowing any foreign individual, entity or a state, any access to sensitive information about our nuclear assets.Secretary of State Hillary Clinton agrees
“We have confidence in the Pakistani government and the military’s control over nuclear weapons.”Hersh has reiterated age old American desire of some how taking Pakistani nukes into "protective custody" to save it from barbaric Pakistanis.
Washington...has been negotiating highly sensitive understandings with the Pakistani military. These would allow specially trained American units to provide added security for the Pakistani arsenal in case of a crisis.And to make matters worse he attempts to malign General Kiyani by branding him as another American stooge -
American scaremongerers like Seymour Hersh need to come out of the wonderland they are living in. Before talking about mutiny in the Pakistan army and trying to help secure our nukes you better pay attention to securing Fort Hood.
understandings on nuclear coöperation benefitted from the increasingly close relationship between Admiral Michael Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and General Kayani, his counterpart, although the C.I.A. and the Departments of Defense, State, and Energy have also been involved.
Sunday, 8 November 2009
Two significant developments in Pakistan that have bearing upon freedom of Media are worth taking note of:
It has been reported that eight major electronic news outlets – KTN, Samaa, DawnNews, Dunya, Express News and Express 24/7, ARY, Geo and Aaj TV have reached an agreement on a code of conduct in terms of the coverage of terrorism. These channels have agreed upon a set of rules governing broadcast of images in the aftermath of a terrorist attack, the need for time-delays on live broadcasts, guidelines for covering hostage situations, the airing of demands and messages by terrorists, and the training and safety of news crews and reporters;
While news media is demonstrating sensitivity to public demand for this kind of code of conduct for self regulation the government appears to be going in the opposite direction. The National Assembly’s Standing Committee on Information and Broadcasting has decided to endorse laws restricting the independence of the electronic media. These are meant to be incorporated into the proposed Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Act 2008. According to reports this is being done to ensure that nothing prejudicial to the ideology of Pakistan or the sovereignty and security of the state is propagated by TV journalists. This argument and the proposed new set of rules is open to misinterpretation and abuse - as has been at various stages in Pakistan's history where similar arguments have been used to throttle freedom of press and political opinion. These rules can amount to sheer censorship and the muzzling of dissent and criticism.
While we should fully endorse and support the steps taken by the electronic media self regulate and to introduce a code of conduct lets hope that attempts to curb their independence by the current political establishment, that owes its very existence to this free media, is checked by the National Assembly. I sincerely hope that this is not one of the long list of suicidal political gaffes by our current lords and masters.
Nawaz Sharif [most popular political leader in Pakistan, if polls are to be believed] appears to be in a daze and confused. His inactivity and inefficiency as leader of the opposition is shocking. He gropes for responses to simple questions [in media interviews]. For example when asked whether he support the military action [against Taliban in North West Pakistan] He appears completely lame, blank and devoid of ideas.
Any claim that this mysterious behaviour is actually a positive attribute - an attempt to avoid destabilising the political system is yet another joke that no one is buying. This is in fact is an insult to the intelligence of Pakistani public.
When his brother’s government [of Punjab province] was toppled [by an executive order of the President] the reaction by Sharif [brothers] was way over the top, one political rally after another followed repeated personal attacks on president Zardari. Message from Sharifs to the central government was clear - either put us back in charge of Punjab or we don’t care if this leads to wrapping of the whole political system once more.
The only understandable difference between then and now is that then it was seen by Sharifs as a personal assault and loss and Sharif’s decided to deal with the situation in a fitting manner, with full vigour, determination and had clearly laid outcome measures nothing short of regaining Punjab government. When however it comes to the interest of Pakistani people he has nothing to say.
But he has nothing to say when it is evident that most of the over eight dozen ministers have put the country up for sale, when the country is brought to a stand still by bomb blasts, when a legislation that stipulates all looters and plunderers are free to go and in the future its legal to kill, steal and plunder, when people spend all their day looking for flour and sugar and low wages and joblessness is pushing people to suicides or selling their children. His argument - he has nothing to say because that will endanger the democracy!
He did not say much in his tax returns to the election commission either. He revealed he has five thousand rupees and has property worth 10 million. I am confident Nawaz Sharif will soon be regretting his obsession with restoring the independent judiciary, as well. Rhetoric is one thing and accountability to honest judiciary another thing. He earned relentless praise while on moral high ground at the time but the question is when the judiciary exercise its power before which all are equal. Will Nawaz Sharif regret his endeavours. Why? Because if he was really as reformed as he tried and lead us to believe after his return from exile “I am now not that old Nawaz Sharif” “You will see a lot of difference in me now” he would have thought long and hard about his duty to this nation as a high stature opposition leader of this country in huge trouble.
Similarly his tax return forms would have had different details. You don’t have to be his accountant to tell it’s full of inaccurate information - in fact, lies. It is very naïve of him and his advisors not to realise that it was not going to go unnoticed by our ever enthusiastic media (most of whom luckily are on the public spirited, apart from some “gold diggers” who have rendered their services to Zardari (this name also literally means gold digger)), is active day and night, quite to the expectation of its viewers.
This very irresponsible act of double standards of a supposedly very responsible person should simply lead to rejection of his papers. What this also proves is sadly Nawaz Sharif has learned nothing from his eight years of dishonour including stripping from Prime Ministerial powers, forced exile, confiscation of businesses and properties, forced conditions on the next ten years of his political life, how he is to live and miserable state of mind. His actions are suspect and his explanations fall way beyond any man with an iota of common sense will accept.
He appears to be very much playing double games and posturing which is aimed at grabbing power prematurely rather than ensuring that under all circumstances the current political regime is allowed to complete its term but that he ensures Pakistan is run like Quaid Azam would have liked to run not the way Zardari is running it, like an underworld don. He failed miserably in his duty to the luckless people of Pakistan, yet again.
He should without any doubt pursue his course for seeking punishment for Musharraf in a persistent and determined manner but he has other and more pressing duties as well. Keep the pressure on Musharraf (which he seems to have suddenly turned off since his recent trip to Saudi Arabia) but help build this nation as well.
He doesn’t have indefinite time to come up with a robust policy and clarity of views. I hope he is aware of advice from Nelson Mandela “We must use time wisely and forever realize that the time is always ripe to do right.” He needs to establish a shadow cabinet for each major ministry to regularly monitor the performance of ministers and ministries, to voice clearly his views on Taliban.
Pakistani public now believe violence has no place in our society so Taliban either give up their arms or should face the consequences, and he should without any lapse of time speak on all issues of national importance with clarity. He needs to trust his financial managers more and send them on endless rounds to Dubai and UK and needs to spend more time inside the country and support the poor people of Pakistan in these testing times, people who despite his dismal previous performances and bowing before dictator and leaving the country rather than confronting him gave him yet another chance. Don't let them question - did he deserve their loyalty?
Monday, 2 November 2009
U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's said on Thursday it was "hard to believe" that no one in Pakistan's government knew where al Qaeda leaders were hiding, striking a new tone on a trip where Washington's credibility has come under attack.I am puzzled that US almighty who can spot drops of water on planet Mars can not pick out the most famous bearded face on earth from a bunch of Pathans from North West Pakistan - if he is really there alive and kicking. With the technological advances that help a lowly operator sitting in a remote CIA building in US wreck havoc on a far off village in Pakistan using unmanned drones, with the Blackwater operatives and other mercenaries active on the ground and with 24/7 monitoring of Pakistan through satellites, the US has been unable to seek and destroy those for whom Mrs Clinton is admonishing Pakistan in failing to apprehend.
I am not for a moment denying that Pakistan have a massive problem to deal with on the Afghan borders but US attempts to bully Pakistan into focussing only on the western borders is as foolish as was the US departure from the region after having internationalised the Afghan Jihad. Problem in Pakistan is no more restricted to Taliban (a very loose term by all accounts) in the West any more. Tentacles of religion based terrorism are now spread into moderate Punjab and are at at risk of becoming unmanageable.
While the number of ordinary Pakistanis killed during the last month crossing the 300 mark Secretary of State could not find a formal link between Indian role in flaming insurgency in Baluchistan and RAW's hand in arming terrorism in NWFP but she also couldn't use her pressure to keep the buffoons like the Indian Defence Minister from adopting threatening postures.
I agree that current Pakistani establishment needs political pressure to keep up with the battle with Taliban. But US needs to realise that Taliban are only once piece of the Jigsaw if a long term and decisive victory against terrorism is to be achieved.
Sunday, 1 November 2009
NRO (National Reconciliation Ordinance promulgated by General Musharraf before he committed political suicide) is now an established swear word in Pakistani politics. To secure his own political future the General granted a presidential amnesty from prosecution to all who had looted Pakistani exchequer on an incomparable scale - prime beneficiary of this ordinance was our sitting President Zardari.
President and majority of his allies who were direct beneficiaries of this amnesty have always claimed innocence and that all charges against them (including those that stood in the Swiss and other overseas courts) were politically motivated and that he could not expect justice when his political foes were in power and the judiciary under their control. That is not the case any more!!! He hold the most powerful political office in the country and the judiciary for all intent and purpose is independent. What stops him from getting his name cleared through the legal process - or is it that the Judiciary is independent and he can't take the risk.
To help all wannabe crooks in the world who can in any way influence their governments I am copying below the full text of the National Reconciliation Ordinance from Pakistan for them to use as a template to get state protection for plundering and looting and getting away with it. Please remember to add General Musharraf to your Christmas cards list to thank him for this handy piece of work. You don't need to do that for President Zardari and his political allies because they would have stolen the Christmas cake baked by your granny and eaten it by the time you know it and wouldn't be able to do anything because they are protected by the NRO.
NATIONAL RECONCILIATION ORDINANCE
October 5, 2007
"AN ORDINANCE to promote national reconciliation
WHEREAS it is expedient to promote national reconciliation, foster mutual trust and confidence amongst holders of public office and remove the vestiges of political vendetta and victimisation, to make the election process more transparent and to amend certain laws for that purpose and for matters connected therewith and ancillary thereto:
AND WHEREAS the National Assembly is not in session and the president is satisfied that circumstances exist, which render it necessary to take immediate action;
NOW, THEREFORE, in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (1) of Article (89) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the president is pleased to make and promulgate the following Ordinance:
1. Short title and commencement.
(1) This ordinance may be called the National Reconciliation Ordinance, 2007
(2) It shall come into force at once.
2. Amendment of section 494, Act V of 1898.
In the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act V of 1898), section 494 shall be renumbered as sub-section (1) thereof and after sub-section (1) renumbered as aforesaid, the following sub-section (2) and (3) shall be added, namely:
"(2) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in sub-section(1), the federal government or a provincial government may, before the judgment is pronounced by a trial court, withdraw from the prosecution of any person including an absconding accused who is found to be falsely involved for political reasons or through political victimization in any case initiated between 1st day of January, 1986 to 12th day of October, 1999 and upon such withdrawal clause (a) and clause (b) of sub-section (1) shall apply.
(3) For the purposes of exercise of powers under sub-section (2) the federal government and the provincial government may each constitute a review board to review the entire record of the case and furnish recommendations as to their withdrawal or otherwise.
(4) The review board in case of Federal Government shall be headed by a retired judge of the Supreme Court with Attorney-General and Federal Law Secretary as its members and in case of Provincial Government it shall be headed by a retired judge of the high court with Advocate-General and/or Prosecutor-General and Provincial Law Secretary as its members.
(5) A review board undertaking review of a case may direct the public prosecutor or any other authority concerned to furnish to it the record of the case."
3. Amendment of section 39, Act LXXXV of 1976.- (1) In the Representation of the People Act, 1976 (LXXXV of 1976), in section 39, after sub-section (6), the following new sub-section (7) shall be added, namely:
"(7) After consolidation of results the Returning Officer shall give to such contesting candidates and their election agents as are present during the consolidation proceedings, a copy of the result of the count notified to the commission immediately against proper receipt and shall also post a copy thereof to the other candidates and election agents".
4. Amendment of section 18, Ordinance XVIII of 1999.
In the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 (XVIII of 1999), hereinafter referred to as the said Ordinance, in section 18, in clause (e), for the full stop at the end a colon shall be substituted and thereafter the following proviso shall be added, namely:
"Provided that no sitting member of Parliament or a Provincial Assembly shall be arrested without taking into consideration the recommendations of the Special Parliamentary Committee on Ethics referred to in clause (aa) or Special Committee of the Provincial Assembly on Ethics referred to in clause (aaa) of section 24, respectively."
5. Amendment of section 24, Ordinance XVIII of 1999.
In the said ordinance, in section 24, (i) in clause (a) for the full stop at the end a colon shall be substituted and thereafter the following proviso shall be inserted, namely.
"Provided that no sitting member of Parliament or a Provincial Assembly shall be arrested without taking into consideration the recommendations of Special Parliamentary Committee on Ethics or Special Committee of the Provincial Assembly on Ethics referred to in clause (aa) and (aaa), respectively, before which the entire material and evidence shall be placed by the chairman, NAB."; and (ii) after clause (a), amended as aforesaid, the following new clauses (aa) and (aaa) shall be inserted, namely;
(aa) The Special Parliamentary Committee on Ethics referred to in the proviso to clause (a) above shall consist of a chairman who shall be a member of either House of Parliament and eight members each from the National Assembly and Senate to be selected by the Speaker, National Assembly and Chairman Senate, respectively, on the recommendations of Leader of the House and Leader of the Opposition of their respective houses, with equal representation from both sides.
(aaa) The Special Committee of the Provincial Assembly on Ethics shall consist of a chairman and eight members to be selected by the Speaker of the Provincial Assembly on the recommendation of Leader of the House and Leader of the Opposition, with equal representation from both sides."
6. Amendment of section 31A, Ordinance XVIII of 1999.
In the said Ordinance, in section 31A, in clause (a), for the full stop at the end a colon shall be substituted and thereafter the following new clause (aa) shall be inserted, namely:
"(aa) An order or judgement passed by the Court in absentia against an accused is void ab initio and shall not be acted upon."
7. Insertion of new section, Ordinance, XVIII of 1999.
In the said Ordinance, after section 33, the following new section shall be inserted, namely:
"33A. Withdrawal and termination of prolonged pending proceedings initiated prior to 12th October, 1999.
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Ordinance or any other law for the time being in force, proceedings under investigation or pending in any court including a high court and the Supreme Court of Pakistan initiated by or on a reference by the National Accountability Bureau inside or outside Pakistan, including proceedings continued under section 33, requests for mutual assistance and civil party to proceedings initiated by the Federal Government before the 12th day of October, 1999 against holders of public office stand withdrawn and terminated with immediate effect and such holders of public office shall also not be liable to any action in future as well under this Ordinance for acts having been done in good faith before the said date;
Provided that those proceedings shall not be withdrawn and terminated which relate to cases registered in connection with the cooperative societies and other financial and investment companies or in which no appeal, revision or constitutional petition has been filed against final judgement and order of the Court or in which an appellate or revisional order or an order in constitutional petition has become final or in which voluntary return or plea bargain has been accepted by the Chairman, National Accountability Bureau under section 25 or recommendations of the Conciliation Committee have been accepted by the Governor, State bank of Pakistan under section 25A.
(2) No action or claim by way of suit, prosecution, complaint or other civil or criminal proceeding shall lie against the Federal, Provincial or Local Government, the National Accountability Bureau or any of their officers and functionaries for any act or thing done or intended to be done in good faith pursuant to the withdrawal and termination of cases under sub-section (1) unless they have deliberately misused authority in violation of law."
Tuesday, 27 October 2009
The contribution to Islamic literature by converts to Islam from other religions has played a very important role in promoting Islam in the west. Despite the media frenzy that is often conferred on Islam, this religion has attracted many great personalities, though not always resulting in their conversion, during the last century. Often one hears suggestions that seem diabolical but these do reflect the extent to which Islam has attracted people's attention.
English is now the second language of the world of Islam after Arabic and Islamic literature published in English language is extremely important, not only for Muslims but for non Muslims as well. Where majority of the Islamic books published in other languages focus on theology, Fiqh and hair-splitting debates on issues that are a little concern of today's man, the research and publication of Islamic books in English language attempt to make Islam relevant to the Zeitgeist.
One of the reasons for this quality Islamic scholarship that has been produced by the converts is their ability to rationally analyse their faith. They discover their faith through a logical progression whereas those who "inherit" their faith do not necessarily go through the same process of self discovery. This often results in inability of the latter to analyse their faith rationally and resorting to arguments that defy logic. Conversion to another religion is not just a step. It marks a long and strenuous process which starts with challenging the existing models and then slowly replacing them with new paradigms. This process is underlined with intensive, and often painful, logical and philosophical dialogue with the self. The experience enables the converts to be able to relate the religion to life. Another fact is that traditional education, as imparted in the religious schools in Muslim countries, focuses on informing the pupils rather than encouraging them to ask questions and challenge the status-quo. This approach transcends into the habit of following an established authority blindly. The focus of western education is to develop analytical thinking and critical analysis skills in individuals. Having been brought up mostly in Europe and America, the converts (and other Muslims brought up in the west) are well equipped with these skills and are well placed to analyse and evaluate their beliefs. Autocratic governments and lack of necessary working conditions in Muslim countries have resulted in the emigration of many scholars to the west.
This certainly represents a possible shift in the centre of gravity of Islamic scholarship to the west. In the words of Murad Hofmann, "... the liveliness of intellectual life necessary for Islamic rejuvenation will probably be found rather in places like Los Angeles, Washington, Leicester, Oxford, Cologne, and Paris than in traditional centres of Muslim learning. It is, therefore, not far-fetched to expect the intellectual and spiritual revivification of Islam in the twenty-first century to be kindled and propelled from research done by qualified Muslim thinkers outside dar al Islam6."
- Dr Murad Hofmann, Islam: The Alternative (Maryland: Amana Publications, 1999), vii
- Ismail Ibrahim Nawwab, "A Matter of Love: Muhammad Asad and Islam," in Muhammad Asad (Leopold Weiss): Europe's Gift to Islam, ed. M. Ikram Chaghatai (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel, 2006), 137
- Dr Murad Hofmann, Journey to Islam: Diary of a German Diplomat: 1951-2000 (Leicester: The Islamic Foundation, 2001), 41
- Ismail Ibrahim Nawwab, "A Matter of Love: Muhammad Asad and Islam," in Muhammad Asad (Leopold Weiss): Europe's Gift to Islam, ed. M. Ikram Chaghatai (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel, 2006), 127
- Maryam Jameelah, Memoirs of Childhood and Youth in America (1945-1962) (Lahore: Muhammad Yusuf Khan, 1989), 109.
- Dr Murad Hofmann, Islam 2000 (Maryland: Amana Publications), 72
Sunday, 25 October 2009
Spirituality and futurology
The spiritual crisis of modern world, which stems from over-emphasis on materialistic rationalism, has been an important subject for Muslim converts over the last century. Some converts to Islam were eminent philosophers and metaphysicists who enjoyed excellent reputation among the western academics. Frithjof Schuon and René Guénon were leading perennial philosophers of the 20th century. Their works represent the highest quality scholarship in perennial philosophy. Schuon's The Transcendent Unity of Religions prompted T.S.Eliot to say: "I have met with no more impressive work in the comparative study of Oriental and Occidental religions". René Guénon's The Crisis of the Modern World and The Reign of Quantity and the Signs of the Times are important works. Both Schuon and Guénon concentrate on the study of religion and its regression in the modern world. Being Schuon's disciple and expositor, Martin Lings wrote The Eleventh Hour: The Spiritual Crisis of the Modern World in the Light of Tradition and Prophecy. Another work by Lings, published posthumously, is A Return to the Spirit: Questions and Answers in which he answers questions relating to his life, Islam and Sufism. HRH The Prince of Wales writes in the foreword, “One of the great privileges of my life has been to know Dr. Martin Lings.... he saw beneath the surface of things and helped us penetrate the veil behind which lies the sacred meaning to so many of life’s mysteries ... I used to look forward so much to what became an annual visit from Martin Lings when I had a chance to explore with him some of his inner discoveries, whether in the world of Shakespeare or of Sufism.” Gai Eaton's Islam and the Destiny of Man and King of the Castle: Choice and Responsibility in the Modern World uncover the spiritual dimensions of Islam and are well written books on a difficult subject.
Political dimension of Islam
After becoming Muslims, many converts to Islam have wholeheartedly identified themselves with the social and political aspirations of the world of Islam. This empathy manifests itself in their writings. Muhammad Asad is a leading example. His Principles of State and Government in Islam explores the theoretical foundations of an Islamic state in modern world. His articles, written in the 1940s in his journal Arafat, discuss the rationale behind the demand for a separate homeland for the Muslims of India. He also highlighted the importance of ijtihad (process of making new laws by independently interpreting the primary sources of Islamic Law) for this age. His booklet, Islam at the Crossroads, published in 1934, is highly critical of western materialism. It briefly reviewed the political and social status of the Muslims and concluded that Muslims should abstain from imitating the "dazzling exterior" of the western civilisation while adopting the good things. He later served as an Ambassador Plenipotentiary for Pakistan in the United Nations. Many other Muslim converts have made worthwhile contributions to the literature on political and social philosophy of Islam. Maryam Jameelah has written many books that explore the social and political dimensions of the Muslims in the 20th century. Murad Hofmann in his book, Religion on the Rise: Islam in the Third Millennium, has attempted to predict the future developments of Islam. His other books also have chapters exploring the issues in detail. In the recent years many other publications contributed by converts to Islam have appeared that explore the socio-political aspects of Islam with the empathy it deserves.
Islamic artists have abstained from depicting human images on the grounds that it may be considered idolatry which is forbidden in Islam. Therefore, Islamic art has mainly focused on architecture, calligraphy, painting and decorative arts. Some really good books have been written by the converts to Islam which have played an important role in introducing the salient features of Islamic art to western readers and art critics. One of the most important works is Titus Burckhardt's Art of Islam, Language and Meaning. This is a scholarly work on this subject and attempts to define the underlying principles of Islamic art. Another notable work is Splendours of Qur'an Calligraphy and Illumination by Martin Lings.
Memoirs and personal narratives
Many converts have written their personal narratives describing how they found their faith. Such works as these have informed us about the spiritual experiences they went through before making their final decision. These works give us some insight into the lives of people who suffer from this unprecedented spiritual crisis that is a hallmark of a materialist and consumerist society.
Many books have appeared since the early 20th century and it does not seem to have stopped. An autobiography of Charles Gai Eaton, A Bad Beginning: The Path to Islam, is due to be published later this month, October 2009. However, no such work has surpassed the extraordinarily written spiritual autobiography by Muhammad Asad, The Road to Mecca. It has served to attract thousands of western readers to the charms of Islamic civilisation. Maryam Jameelah (aka Margaret Marcus) wrote in her autobiography that as a young American Jewish girl, she discovered Asad's book in a public library near her home. Her parents would not allow her to take out the book, so she read it in the library over and over. "What he could do, I thought I could also do, only how much harder for a single woman than for a man! But I vowed to Allah that at the first opportunity, I would follow his example." After conversion, she later moved to Lahore on the advice of Maulana Maududi. The charm of Asad's book seems never ending. This is reflected in its continued publication more than 50 years after it first hit the bookshops in New York and London.
In the next post, we'll conclude this discussion; and will see how this is helping in the propagation of Islam in the world.
Educational institutions have been closed in order to give them time to put "security" in place. Unlike the Presidency or Prime Minister House in Islamabad universities do not have physical walls to prevent terrorists from walking in. Nation is feeling insecure and morale is at its lowest.
Cyril Almeida recently wrote on the absence of our political leadership from the scene (discounting their mugshots on the television media) and its reluctance to reach out to the masses to raise their morale:
But have you seen Zardari visiting the injured, condoling with the families of the dead, drumming up the morale of ordinary government officials, supporting the troops out in the field? Sure, he’s a target and his security phobias are already the stuff of legend. But even by the wretched standards of recent times, these are extraordinary days and the public needs reassurance more urgently than ever.
Have you seen the prime minister with his arm around an elderly woman who has lost her home and is living the humiliating life of an IDP? Have you seen the prime minister kneeling at the side of a father whose child has been riddled with pellets from a suicide bomber’s vest? Have you seen the prime minister striding into a crowd of grieving families and listening to their woes? Have you seen the prime minister sitting down with army jawans and sharing a meal?Our current political leadership, whether in government or opposition, believe that (1) they are ruling the country anointed by the US and not because of the votes given by the common people of Pakistan, (2) they have a birth right to rule because they were born in one clan or another, (3) ordinary people who vote them into power are morons and will do so any way - so why bother. How would you expect such leadership to put their lives on the line and be with the people to raise their morale!
Friday, 23 October 2009
The magnitude of work that exists makes a detailed review and classification a daunting task. This effort does not aim at presenting a systematic study of literature but merely an attempt to introduce a lay person to the wonderful legacy of these illustrious Muslim converts.
Translation and exegeses of the Qur'an
A quick survey of English translations of the Holy Qur'an shows the valiant efforts that Muslim converts have made to propagate the divine message of Allah. Marmaduke Pickthall's The Meaning of the Glorious Qur'an, first published in 1930, was the first English translation to achieve mass popularity. It is noted for its archaic language and is still published and read widely even today.
An extremely important addition to the English translations of the Holy Qur'an is Muhammad Asad'sThe Message of the Qur'an. First published in 1980, it was a result of 17 years of hard work and a lifetime of study and research. Asad's profound knowledge of classical Arabic and deep understanding of Arab tribal culture are reflected in his explanatory notes. This work is noted for Asad's rationalist approach toward understanding the message of the Qur'an. This translation was criticised by orthodoxy for its Mutazilite inclination and was banned in Saudi Arabia. Coincidentally, this is his attempt to explain the message of the Qur'an rationally that makes him extremely popular among the western readers and Muslims who prefer logical argumentation. Another feature of this work is that Asad, explaining a verse, cites opinions of great Qur'an exegete of the past - Daraqutni, Ibn Kathir, Ibn Taymiyyah, Zamakhshari, Abd'hu, Al-Tabbari, Suyuti, just to name a few - and then justifies his preference for one of them. This work is rightly considered his magnum opus.
More recent English translations include Dr T. B. Irving's The Qur'an: First American Version and The Noble Qur'an by Aisha & Abdalhaqq Bewley. Dr Irving was conferred the Star of Excellence by the Government of Pakistan in 1983 for his services to Islam.
Muslim converts have also translated or edited earlier translations of the Qur'an in other languages. Dr Murad Hofmann has edited a German language translation of the Qur'an originally published at the beginning of the 20th century. In September this year, he has been selected as the Islamic Personality of the Year by Dubai International Holy Qur'an Award.
Muslims regard the Qur'an as 'untranslatable'. Therefore, no translation can be perfect or definitive. However, Qur'an translations by Muslim converts have significantly, if not completely, reduced the reliance on the translations carried out by non-Muslims who had little empathy for their subject. We now have translations carried out with intellectual honesty by those who were native to the language and the society.
Translation of Hadith and Fiqh literature
Hadith is the next important source of Islamic Law after the Holy Qur'an. Six major Hadith collections form the canon of Islamic Law along with the Holy Qur'an, eventually resulting in Islamic Jurisprudence (Fiqh) as compiled by different canon law jurists. Canon law jurists differ in their explanation of certain traditions of the Prophet (saw) which has resulted in different schools of Islamic jurisprudence. The Hadith and Fiqh literature was originally compiled in Arabic and subsequently translated into other language as Islam spread in non-Arab territories. As majority of the Muslims don't understand Arabic, therefore, Muslim scholars have always actively engaged in transferring the Hadith and Fiqh knowledge in other languages. The first major attempt to translate into English the most authentic Hadith collection from Al-Bukhari came from Muhammad Asad. He was working on this project in 1947, when flood in the River Ravi and riots that followed the partition of India destroyed some of his manuscripts beyond recovery. His later engagements did not allow him to complete the work but completed parts were later published as Sahih al-Bukhari: The Early Years of Islam.
Several books have been written by Muslim converts that discuss various aspects of Hadith and Islamic Law. The study of evolution of Fiqh has always been a bit of a challenge for an average western reader. Tim Winter's small book titled Understanding the Four Madhabs and The Four Imams and Their Schools by Dr Gibril Haddad are very useful works, especially for those who do not understand Arabic, Persian or Urdu. Another work that is worth mentioning is the translation of Muhammad Abu Zahra's works on the four imams by Aisha Bewley. She has also translated Imam Malik's Mawatta.
A related area of Islamic scholarship is the life and personality of the Prophet (saw). Of all the biographical works on the Prophet (saw) that have been written by Muslim converts, Martin Lings's Muhammad: His Life Based on the Earliest Sources warrants special mention. It is considered the best biography of the Prophet (saw) outside of Arabic language. Lings was recognised by the governments of Egypt and Pakistan for his work.
In the next post, we'll review efforts made by Muslim converts in other related areas of Islamic literature.
Wednesday, 21 October 2009
Against this background, it is only natural for the Muslims to desire and make an effort to explain themselves and their faith with respect to the Zeitgeist. The underlying objective is to ascertain that Islam is not a spent force but rather a valid and pragmatic alternative to western civilisation1, that is in waiting. Many of these attempts focus on explicating certain myths which have marred the face of Islam in the west, while others have tried, more courageously, to reinterpret the various aspects of Islam in the light of new developments in the fields of science, psychology, anthropology, sociology and history.
Attempts to marry reason with faith and reconstruct religious thought, either under the spell of Greek philosophy or European Movement of Enlightenment, are not a new phenomenon by any means. Conflicts between the Mutazilites (Mu'tazilah) and the Asharites (Ash'ariyyah) which started as early as the 9th century or the intellectual debate between Al-Ghazali (1058-1111) and Averroes (Ibn Rushd) (1126-1198) in the 12th century substantiate this assertion. The rationalist school of Mu'tazilah movement has never disappeared since it started in the 8th century. Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905), his disciple Rashid Rida (1865-1935) and Muhammad Asad (1900-1992) have continued to follow the rationalist approach by attempting to explain the tenets of Islam in line with the European rationalism.
In the 20th century, among Muslims, converts to Islam from other religions have made disproportionate contributions to make Islam more approachable and comprehensible to western readers. They have produced, and continue to produce, Islamic literature that has played a significant part in casting aside many centuries-old myths and fears of Islam in the west.2 For example, no other Islamic scholar in the 20th century has contributed more to the explanation and propagation of Islam in the west than the Austrian Muhammad Asad (aka Leopold Weiss).3
According to a recent report, every one in four persons in this world is a Muslim. The 20th century witnessed a significant increase in the rate of conversion to Islam, especially in the west. Western obsession with materialism and the ideology that underpins complete rationalisation of human mind into the causal philosophy have resulted in a spiritual crisis. A large number of people feel uncomfortable about systematisation of human life to the sole advantage of corporate culture that governs the consumerist society. They are irresistibly attracted by the powerful emotional symbolism of a religion. They discover that Islam is 'the' alternative that has the ability to transform their lives. Since the beginning of the 20th century, many great scholars, writers, artists and scientists have converted to Islam following their study of Islamic literature. Committed as they were to the vision and way of life propounded by their newly adopted faith, they subsequently attempted to contribute to the literature on Islam, bringing fresh thinking into the otherwise static edifice of literature on Islam. This group of Muslim converts has contributed profoundly to Islamic literature in the second half of the 20th century and their intellectual achievements have subsequently helped propagate Islam even farther.
Some of these distinguished Muslim converts of the 20th century include:
- Lord Stanley of Alderley (1827-1903), a historian and Bertrand Russell's uncle
- Muhammad Asad (aka Leopold Weiss) (1900-1992), a writer, diplomat, and translator of the Qur'an
- Lord Headley El-Farooq (aka Shaikh Saifurrahman Rehmatullah El-Farooq) (1855-1935), a member of the House of Lords, a writer and an activist
- Mohammed Marmaduke Pickthall (1876-1936), a novelist and translator of the Qur'an
- Martin Lings (aka Abu Bakr Siraj Ad-Din) (1909-2005), an English Sufi Muslim and writer
- Charles Le Gai Eaton (aka Hassan Abdul Hakeem) (b. 1921), a writer and diplomat
- René Guénon (aka Abd al-Wahid Yahya) (1886-1951), an eminent metaphysicist and Sufi Muslim
- Vincent Mansour Monteil (1913-2005), an orientalist, linguist, anthropologist and humanist
- Murad Wilfried Hofmann (b.1931), a diplomat, German Ambassador to Algeria and Morocco and writer
- Baron Omar Rolf von Ehrenfels (1901-1980), an Austrian anthropologist and orientalist
- Abdul Karim Germanus (1884-1979), a Hungarian university professor and orientalist
- Frithjof Schuon (aka Shaykh Isa Nur al-Din Ahmad) (1907-1998), a great philosopher
- Ivan Aguéli (aka Sheikh Abd al-Hadi Aqili) (1869-1917), a Swiss Sufi, painter and writer
- Thomas Irving (aka Ta'lim Ali Abu Nasr) (1914-2002), an Islamic scholar and translator of the Qur'an
- Margaret Marcus (aka Maryam Jameelah) (b. 1934), a writer
- Cyril Glassé (b.1944), author of The Concise Encyclopaedia of Islam and other Islamic works
- Jeffrey Lang (b.1954), a mathematician and writer on Islam
- Michael Wolfe (b.1945), a poet, novelist and writer of travel books
- Tim Winter (aka Abdal Hakim Murad) (b.1960), a British Muslim scholar and teacher
- Aisha Bewley (b.1948), a writer and translator of the Qur'an
The next post will briefly review important literary contributions these Muslim converts have made in various areas. Please note the references will be provided in the concluding post.
Tuesday, 20 October 2009
Islam encourages quest for knowledge, research and thinking to understand and interpret the words of God and Islam as a religion. A disproportionately large population of Muslims in the world prefer to lead their lives like programmed robots - in a state of collective hypnosis. This is because once born a Muslim we stop the intellectual discourse. This is contrary to what Prophet Muhammad (saw) asked from the Ummah!
Pakistan and other Muslim countries would not be in the mess we are in if ordinary Muslims were more open to learning about Islam, the Quran and Islamic ways of life - and if they were not easily taken by the shallow but hypnotic messages from the hard line fundamentalists.
For Muslims converts who chose the religion, after having travelled on road to self discovery, the situation is different. It is our premise that over the last couple of centuries contribution of Muslim converts (those who chose Islam not born in it) to the overall body of knowledge in Islam is significantly higher than born Muslims. In a series of posts following this one my colleague Anwar Ahmad will be presenting a argument to support this view. Watch this space...
Friday, 16 October 2009
Though the US government would like Pakistanis to believe that by approving this new law “President Obama wanted to engage Pakistan on the basis of a strategic partnership ‘grounded in support for Pakistan’s democratic institutions and the Pakistani people’ “ much of mainstream Pakistani media and most of the political opposition has been having fits of anger over the alleged transgression into Pakistani sovereignty by the American congress. Pakistan Army broke protocol by going public in its opposition to the bill. While the Pakistani government is at pains to describe it as an unprecedented political achievement, ordinary people are as clueless about what's going on as George Bush was during his entire presidency. They are all wrong in one way or the other and here is why.
Let us have look at what the bill is all about. Kerry Lugar Bill or Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 is now a law under which the Congress has authorised the American president to provide non-military aid to Pakistan to support:
- strengthening of civilian democratic institutions
- expansion of rule of law through capacity building and bringing in transparency
- sustainable economic development and freedom
- investment in people especially women and children
- combating militancy through public diplomacy
- fight and win counterinsurgency within Pakistani borders
- stop Pakistani territory from being used as a base or conduit for terrorist attacks
- promote control of military institutions by a democratically elected civilian government
- Pakistan continues to cooperate with the US in efforts to curb unauthorised sale/distribution of nuclear weapons/information (including providing direct access to Pakistani nationals associated/involved in proliferation networks)
- The Government of Pakistan remains committed to the fight against terrorism
- The government, including the military and intelligence agencies, are ceasing support to terrorists/militants operating in Afghanistan or ‘against the territory or people of neighbouring countries’
- The Government of Pakistan is preventing terrorist groups from carrying out cross-border attacks, is dismantling terrorists’ bases in the country, and strengthening counter-terrorism and anti-money-laundering laws
- The security forces of Pakistan are not materially and substantially subverting the political or judicial process in the country
No sane person in Pakistan or abroad will disagree with any of the objectives set out in the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act. All the conditions attached are on the wish list of every patriot Pakistani and we would like these to be implemented in Pakistan as a part of change that is essentially needed. So what is the source of discontent, then!
Pakistan army is unhappy that the law requires the aid to be used to “promote control of military institutions by a democratically elected civilian government”. It asks the US Secretary of State to certify that “the security forces of Pakistan are not materially and substantially subverting the political or judicial processes of Pakistan”. Material and substantial subversion of political set up by military might be considered as their birth right by some generals in the Pakistan army but they wouldn’t like the Americans to be putting this on record and so bluntly.
What’s even more humiliating, for Pakistan's security apparatus is that the law also requires the US Secretary of State to confirm that the Government of Pakistan has taken action to “ceasing support, including by any elements within the Pakistan military or its intelligence agency, to extremist and terrorist groups, particularly to any group that has conducted attacks against United States or coalition forces in Afghanistan, or against the territory or people of neighbouring countries” – thus directly implicating Pakistan army and intelligence agencies in acts of terrorism especially in India. This is where army has the support of the masses as well.
Right wing political opposition is unhappy at the bill because it has clearly been drafted with explicit input of the Indian lobby in US without any acknowledgement to Pakistan’s geo political interests. References to Muridke and Punjab as terrorist hubs, and formally asking the security agencies to "cease support" of terrorism highlights Indian influence on drafting of this bill and has served no other purpose than to irk a vast majority of ordinary Pakistanis.
Our erstwhile president and his minions are at pains to describe this as a democracy friendly law and a massive political achievement for the current government in Pakistan. If their pleasure is driven out of the clauses that appear to be supportive of the political establishment and against the military adventurism they better wake up. With every clause and condition, including those that stand out in support of civilian and political infrastructure, there is room provided to US president and Secretary of State to seek waiver from most of the clauses in the law if "the Secretary of State determines that is important to the national security interests of the United States to do so" – effectively meaning that the aid could continue to pour in even if there is another military takeover in Pakistan, for as long as it is in US interest.
I welcome the rigour, control, checks and balances that the law requires to ensure that the aid provided is spent on the areas that it is supposed to be used for. I believe that most of the content including civil military relationship is in line with the broader wishes of a common man in Pakistan. It would have benefited from slightly different drafting by an intelligent diplomat - which I do no think is the case currently. Language of certain clauses in the bill reminded me of an Urdu phrase "Bakri nay doodh diya woh bhi maingni bhara" literally meaning that the goat gave milk but dropped in it her faeces in the process.
The law is a significant coup for the Indian foreign office as they managed to make a US law serve the Indian agenda so blatantly. It is, however, a disgrace for Pakistan foreign office and failure of its foreign policy for letting the Indian foreign policy dictate its relations with US.
Sunday, 11 October 2009
A vast majority of people commenting are doing so without having seen the actual bill itself. Before I join an ever increasing long list of people with views (in my next post) on the bill lets have a read through the actual text of the much maligned (fairly or unfairly in Pakistan) Kerry Lugar Bill.
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
- (a) Short Title- This Act may be cited as the `Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009'.
- (b) Table of Contents- The table of contents for this Act is as follows:
- Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
- Sec. 2. Definitions.
- Sec. 3. Findings.
- Sec. 4. Statement of principles.
TITLE I--DEMOCRATIC, ECONOMIC, AND DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FOR PAKISTAN
- Sec. 101. Authorization of assistance.
- Sec. 102. Authorization of appropriations.
- Sec. 103. Auditing.
TITLE II--SECURITY ASSISTANCE FOR PAKISTAN
- Sec. 201. Purposes of assistance.
- Sec. 202. Authorization of assistance.
- Sec. 203. Limitations on certain assistance.
- Sec. 204. Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund.
- Sec. 205. Requirements for civilian control of certain assistance.
TITLE III--STRATEGY, ACCOUNTABILITY, MONITORING, AND OTHER PROVISIONS
- Sec. 301. Strategy Reports.
- Sec. 302. Monitoring Reports.
- In this Act:
- (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES- Except as otherwise provided in this Act, the term `appropriate congressional committees' means the Committees on Appropriations and Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committees on Appropriations and Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.
- (2) COUNTERINSURGENCY- The term `counterinsurgency' means efforts to defeat organized movements that seek to overthrow the duly constituted Governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan through violent means.
- (3) COUNTERTERRORISM- The term `counterterrorism' means efforts to combat al Qaeda and other foreign terrorist organizations that are designated by the Secretary of State in accordance with section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189), or other individuals and entities engaged in terrorist activity or support for such activity.
- (4) FATA- The term `FATA' means the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan.
- (5) FRONTIER CRIMES REGULATION- The term `Frontier Crimes Regulation' means the Frontier Crimes Regulation, codified under British law in 1901, and applicable to the FATA.
- (6) IMPACT EVALUATION RESEARCH- The term `impact evaluation research' means the application of research methods and statistical analysis to measure the extent to which change in a population-based outcome can be attributed to program intervention instead of other environmental factors.
- (7) MAJOR DEFENSE EQUIPMENT- The term `major defense equipment' has the meaning given the term in section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2794(6)).
- (8) NWFP- The term `NWFP' means the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan, which has Peshawar as its provincial capital.
- (9) OPERATIONS RESEARCH- The term `operations research' means the application of social science research methods, statistical analysis, and other appropriate scientific methods to judge, compare, and improve policies and program outcomes, from the earliest stages of defining and designing programs through their development and implementation, with the objective of the rapid dissemination of conclusions and concrete impact on programming.
- (10) SECURITY FORCES OF PAKISTAN- The term `security forces of Pakistan' means the military and intelligence services of the Government of Pakistan, including the Armed Forces, Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate, Intelligence Bureau, police forces, levies, Frontier Corps, and Frontier Constabulary.
- (11) SECURITY-RELATED ASSISTANCE- The term `security-related assistance'--
- (A) means--
- (i) grant assistance to carry out section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763); and
- (ii) assistance under chapter 2 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2311 et. seq); but
- (B) does not include--
- (i) assistance authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available under any provision of law that is funded from accounts within budget function 050 (National Defense); and
- (ii) amounts appropriated or otherwise available to the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund established under the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (Public Law 111-32).
- Congress finds the following:
- (1) The people of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the United States share a long history of friendship and comity, and the interests of both nations are well-served by strengthening and deepening this friendship.
- (2) Since 2001, the United States has contributed more than $15,000,000,000 to Pakistan, of which more than $10,000,000,000 has been security-related assistance and direct payments.
- (3) With the free and fair election of February 18, 2008, Pakistan returned to civilian rule, reversing years of political tension and mounting popular concern over military rule and Pakistan's own democratic reform and political development.
- (4) Pakistan is a major non-NATO ally of the United States and has been a valuable partner in the battle against al Qaeda and the Taliban, but much more remains to be accomplished by both nations.
- (5) The struggle against al Qaeda, the Taliban, and affiliated terrorist groups has led to the deaths of several thousand Pakistani civilians and members of the security forces of Pakistan over the past seven years.
- (6) Despite killing or capturing hundreds of al Qaeda operatives and other terrorists--including major al Qaeda leaders, such as Khalid Sheikh Muhammad, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, and Abu Faraj al-Libi--the FATA, parts of the NWFP, Quetta in Balochistan, and Muridke in Punjab remain a sanctuary for al Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, the Terikh-e Taliban and affiliated groups from which these groups organize terrorist actions against Pakistan and other countries.
- (7) The security forces of Pakistan have struggled to contain a Taliban-backed insurgency, recently taking direct action against those who threaten Pakistan's security and stability, including military operations in the FATA and the NWFP.
- (8) On March 27, 2009, President Obama noted, `Multiple intelligence estimates have warned that al Qaeda is actively planning attacks on the United States homeland from its safe-haven in Pakistan.'.
- (9) According to a Government Accountability Office report (GAO-08-622), `since 2003, the [A]dministration's national security strategies and Congress have recognized that a comprehensive plan that includes all elements of national power--diplomatic, military, intelligence, development assistance, economic, and law enforcement support--was needed to address the terrorist threat emanating from the FATA' and that such a strategy was also mandated by section 7102(b)(3) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-458; 22 U.S.C. 2656f note) and section 2042(b)(2) of the Implementing the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (Public Law 110-53; 22 U.S.C. 2375 note).
- (10) During 2008 and 2009, the people of Pakistan have been especially hard hit by rising food and commodity prices and severe energy shortages, with 2/3 of the population living on less than $2 a day and 1/5 of the population living below the poverty line according to the United Nations Development Program.
- (11) Economic growth is a fundamental foundation for human security and national stability in Pakistan, a country with more than 175,000,000 people, an annual population growth rate of two percent, and a ranking of 136 out of 177 countries in the United Nations Human Development Index.
- (12) The 2009 Pakistani military offensive in the NWFP and the FATA displaced millions of residents in one of the gravest humanitarian crises Pakistan has faced, and despite the heroic efforts of Pakistanis to respond to the needs of the displaced millions and facilitate the return of many, it has highlighted the need for Pakistan to develop an effective national counterinsurgency strategy.
- Congress declares that the relationship between the United States and Pakistan should be based on the following principles:
- (1) Pakistan is a critical friend and ally to the United States, both in times of strife and in times of peace, and the two countries share many common goals, including combating terrorism and violent radicalism, solidifying democracy and rule of law in Pakistan, and promoting the social and economic development of Pakistan.
- (2) United States assistance to Pakistan is intended to supplement, not supplant, Pakistan's own efforts in building a stable, secure, and prosperous Pakistan.
- (3) The United States requires a balanced, integrated, countrywide strategy for Pakistan that provides assistance throughout the country and does not disproportionately focus on security-related assistance or one particular area or province.
- (4) The United States supports Pakistan's struggle against extremist elements and recognizes the profound sacrifice made by Pakistan in the fight against terrorism, including the loss of more than 1,900 soldiers and police since 2001 in combat with al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other extremist and terrorist groups.
- (5) The United States intends to work with the Government of Pakistan--
- (A) to build mutual trust and confidence by actively and consistently pursuing a sustained, long-term, multifaceted relationship between the two countries, devoted to strengthening the mutual security, stability, and prosperity of both countries;
- (B) to support the people of Pakistan and their democratic government in their efforts to consolidate democracy, including strengthening Pakistan's parliament, helping Pakistan reestablish an independent and transparent judicial system, and working to extend the rule of law in all areas in Pakistan;
- (C) to promote sustainable long-term development and infrastructure projects, including in healthcare, education, water management, and energy programs, in all areas of Pakistan, that are sustained and supported by each successive democratic government in Pakistan;
- (D) to ensure that all the people of Pakistan, including those living in areas governed by the Frontier Crimes Regulation, have access to public, modernized education and vocational training to enable them to provide for themselves, for their families, and for a more prosperous future for their children;
- (E) to support the strengthening of core curricula and the quality of schools across Pakistan, including madrassas, in order to improve the prospects for Pakistani children's futures and eliminate incitements to violence and intolerance;
- (F) to encourage and promote public-private partnerships in Pakistan in order to bolster ongoing development efforts and strengthen economic prospects, especially with respect to opportunities to build civic responsibility and professional skills of the people of Pakistan, including support for institutions of higher learning with international accreditation;
- (G) to expand people-to-people engagement between the two countries, through increased educational, technical, and cultural exchanges and other methods;
- (H) to encourage the development of local analytical capacity to measure program effectiveness and progress on an integrated basis, especially across the areas of United States assistance and payments to Pakistan, and increase accountability for how such assistance and payments are being spent;
- (I) to assist Pakistan's efforts to improve counterterrorism financing and anti-money laundering regulatory structure in order to achieve international standards and encourage Pakistan to apply for `Financial Action Task Force' observer status and adhere to the United Nations International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism;
- (J) to strengthen Pakistan's counterinsurgency and counterterrorism strategy to help prevent any territory of Pakistan from being used as a base or conduit for terrorist attacks in Pakistan or elsewhere;
- (K) to strengthen Pakistan's efforts to develop strong and effective law enforcement and national defense forces under civilian leadership;
- (L) to achieve full cooperation in matters of counter-proliferation of nuclear materials and related networks;
- (M) to strengthen Pakistan's efforts to gain control of its under-governed areas and address the threat posed by any person or group that conducts violence, sabotage, or other terrorist activities in Pakistan or its neighboring countries; and
- (N) to explore means to consult with and utilize the relevant expertise and skills of the Pakistani-American community.
TITLE I--DEMOCRATIC, ECONOMIC, AND DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FOR PAKISTAN
- (a) In General- The President is authorized to provide assistance to Pakistan--
- (1) to support the consolidation of democratic institutions;
- (2) to support the expansion of rule of law, build the capacity of government institutions, and promote respect for internationally-recognized human rights;
- (3) to promote economic freedoms and sustainable economic development;
- (4) to support investment in people, including those displaced in on-going counterinsurgency operations; and
- (5) to strengthen public diplomacy.
- (b) Activities Supported- Activities that may be supported by assistance under subsection (a) include the following:
- (1) To support democratic institutions in Pakistan in order to strengthen civilian rule and long-term stability, including assistance such as--
- (A) support for efforts to strengthen Pakistan's institutions, including the capacity of the National Parliament of Pakistan, such as enhancing the capacity of committees to oversee government activities, including national security issues, enhancing the ability of members of parliament to respond to constituents, and supporting of parliamentary leadership;
- (B) support for voter education and civil society training as well as appropriate support for political party capacity building and responsiveness to the needs of all the people of Pakistan; and
- (C) support for strengthening the capacity of the civilian Government of Pakistan to carry out its responsibilities at the national, provincial, and local levels.
- (2) To support Pakistan's efforts to expand rule of law, build the capacity, transparency, and trust in government institutions, and promote internationally recognized human rights, including assistance such as--
- (A) supporting the establishment of frameworks that promote government transparency and criminalize corruption in both the government and private sector;
- (B) support for police professionalization, including training regarding use of force, human rights, and community policing;
- (C) support for independent, efficient, and effective judicial and criminal justice systems, such as case management, training, and efforts to enhance the rule of law to all areas in Pakistan;
- (D) support for the implementation of legal and political reforms in the FATA;
- (E) support to counter the narcotics trade;
- (F) support for internationally recognized human rights, including strengthening civil society and nongovernmental organizations working in the area of internationally recognized human rights, as well as organizations that focus on protection of women and girls, promotion of freedom of religion and religious tolerance, and protection of ethnic or religious minorities; and
- (G) support for promotion of a responsible, capable, and independent media.
- (3) To support economic freedom and economic development in Pakistan, including--
- (A) programs that support sustainable economic growth, including in rural areas, and the sustainable management of natural resources through investments in water resource management systems;
- (B) expansion of agricultural and rural development, such as farm-to-market roads, systems to prevent spoilage and waste, and other small-scale infrastructure improvements;
- (C) investments in energy, including energy generation and cross-border infrastructure projects with Afghanistan;
- (D) employment generation, including increasing investment in infrastructure projects, including construction of roads and the continued development of a national aviation industry and aviation infrastructure, as well as support for small and medium enterprises;
- (E) worker rights, including the right to form labor unions and legally enforce provisions safeguarding the rights of workers and local community stakeholders;
- (F) access to microfinance for small business establishment and income generation, particularly for women; and
- (G) countering radicalization by providing economic, social, educational, and vocational opportunities and life-skills training to at-risk youth.
- (4) To support investments in people, particularly women and children, including--
- (A) promoting modern, public primary and secondary education and vocational and technical training, including programs to assist in the development of modern, nationwide school curriculums for public, private, and religious schools; support for the proper oversight of all educational institutions, including religious schools, as required by Pakistani law; initiatives to enhance access to education and vocational and technical training for women and girls and to increase women's literacy, with a special emphasis on helping girls stay in school; and construction and maintenance of libraries and public schools;
- (B) programs relating to higher education to ensure a breadth and consistency of Pakistani graduates, including through public-private partnerships;
- (C) improving quality public health to eliminate diseases such as hepatitis and to reduce maternal and under-five mortality rates;
- (D) building capacity for nongovernmental and civil society organizations, particularly organizations with demonstrated experience in delivering services to the people of Pakistan, particularly to women, children, and other vulnerable populations; and
- (E) support for refugees and internally displaced persons and long-term development in regions of Pakistan where internal conflict has caused large-scale displacement.
- (5) To strengthen public diplomacy to combat militant extremism and promote a better understanding of the United States, including--
- (A) encouraging civil society, respected scholars, and other leaders to speak out against militancy and violence; and
- (B) expanded exchange activities under the Fulbright Program, the International Visitor Leadership Program, the Youth Exchange and Study Program, and related programs administered by the Department of State designed to promote mutual understanding and interfaith dialogue and expand sister institution programs between United States and Pakistani schools and universities.
- (c) Additional and Related Activities-
- (1) AVAILABILITY OF AMOUNTS FOR PAKISTANI POLICE PROFESSIONALIZATION, EQUIPPING, AND TRAINING- Not less than $150,000,000 of the amounts appropriated for fiscal year 2010 pursuant to the authorization of appropriations under section 102 should be made available for assistance to Pakistan under this section for police professionalization, equipping, and training.
- (2) AVAILABILITY OF AMOUNTS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES- Up to $10,000,000 of the amounts appropriated for each fiscal year pursuant to the authorization of appropriations under section 102 may be made available for administrative expenses of civilian departments and agencies of the United States Government in connection with the provision of assistance under this section. Such amounts shall be in addition to amounts otherwise available for such purposes.
- (3) UTILIZING PAKISTANI ORGANIZATIONS- The President is encouraged, as appropriate, to utilize Pakistani firms and community and local nongovernmental organizations in Pakistan, including through host country contracts, and to work with local leaders to provide assistance under this section.
- (4) USE OF DIRECT EXPENDITURES- Amounts appropriated for each fiscal year pursuant to the authorization of appropriations under section 102 or otherwise made available to carry out this section shall be utilized to the maximum extent possible as direct expenditures for projects and programs, subject to existing reporting and notification requirements.
- (5) CHIEF OF MISSION FUND- Of the amounts appropriated for each fiscal year pursuant to the authorization of appropriations under section 102, up to $5,000,000 may be used by the Secretary of State to establish a fund for use by the Chief of Mission in Pakistan to provide assistance to Pakistan under this title or the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) to address urgent needs or opportunities, consistent with the purposes of this section, or for purposes of humanitarian relief. The fund established pursuant to this paragraph may be referred to as the `Chief of Mission Fund'.
- (6) SENSE OF CONGRESS- It is the sense of Congress that--
- (A) the United States should provide robust assistance to the people of Pakistan who have been displaced as a result of ongoing conflict and violence in Pakistan and support international efforts to coordinate assistance to refugees and internally displaced persons in Pakistan, including by providing support to international and nongovernmental organizations for this purpose;
- (B) the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development should support the development objectives of the Refugee Affected and Host Areas (RAHA) Initiative in Pakistan to address livelihoods, health, education, infrastructure development, and environmental restoration in identified parts of the country where Afghan refugees have lived; and
- (C) the United States should have a coordinated, strategic communications strategy to engage the people of Pakistan and to help ensure the success of the measures authorized by this title.
- (d) Notification- For fiscal years 2010 through 2014, the President shall notify the appropriate congressional committees not later than 15 days before obligating any assistance under this section as budgetary support to the Government of Pakistan or any element of the Government of Pakistan and shall include in such notification a description of the purpose and conditions attached to any such budgetary support.
- (a) In General- There are authorized to be appropriated to the President, for the purposes of providing assistance to Pakistan under this title and to provide assistance to Pakistan under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.), up to $1,500,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2010 through 2014.
- (b) Availability of Funds-
- (1) IN GENERAL- Of the amounts appropriated in each fiscal year pursuant to the authorization of appropriations in subsection (a)--
- (A) none of the amounts appropriated for assistance to Pakistan may be made available after the date that is 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act unless the Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report has been submitted to the appropriate congressional committees pursuant to section 301(a); and
- (B) not more than $750,000,000 may be made available for assistance to Pakistan unless the President's Special Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan submits to the appropriate congressional committees during such fiscal year--
- (i) a certification that assistance provided to Pakistan under this title or the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to date has made or is making reasonable progress toward achieving the principal objectives of United States assistance to Pakistan contained in the Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report; and
- (ii) a memorandum explaining the reasons justifying the certification described in clause (i).
- (2) MAKER OF CERTIFICATION- In the event of a vacancy in, or the termination of, the position of the President's Special Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan, the certification and memorandum described under paragraph (1)(B) may be made by the Secretary of State.
- (c) Waiver- The Secretary of State may waive the limitations in subsection (b) if the Secretary determines, and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees, that it is in the national security interests of the United States to do so.
- (d) Sense of Congress on Foreign Assistance Funds- It is the sense of Congress that, subject to an improving political and economic climate in Pakistan, there should be authorized to be appropriated up to $1,500,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2015 through 2019 for the purpose of providing assistance to Pakistan under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.
- (a) Assistance Authorized- The Inspector General of the Department of State, the Inspector General of the United States Agency for International Development, and the inspectors general of other Federal departments and agencies (other than the Inspector General of the Department of Defense) carrying out programs, projects, and activities using amounts appropriated to carry out this title shall audit, investigate, and oversee the obligation and expenditure of such amounts.
- (b) Authorization for In-Country Presence- The Inspector General of the Department of State and the Inspector General of the United States Agency for International Development, after consultation with the Secretary of State and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, are authorized to establish field offices in Pakistan with sufficient staff from each of the Offices of the Inspector General, respectively, to carry out subsection (a).
- (c) Authorization of Appropriations-
- (1) IN GENERAL- Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 102 for each of the fiscal years 2010 through 2014, up to $30,000,000 for each fiscal year is authorized to be made available to carry out this section.
- (2) RELATION TO OTHER AVAILABLE FUNDS- Amounts made available under paragraph (1) are in addition to amounts otherwise available for such purposes.
TITLE II--SECURITY ASSISTANCE FOR PAKISTAN
- The purposes of assistance under this title are--
- (1) to support Pakistan's paramount national security need to fight and win the ongoing counterinsurgency within its borders in accordance with its national security interests;
- (2) to work with the Government of Pakistan to improve Pakistan's border security and control and help prevent any Pakistani territory from being used as a base or conduit for terrorist attacks in Pakistan, or elsewhere;
- (3) to work in close cooperation with the Government of Pakistan to coordinate action against extremist and terrorist targets; and
- (4) to help strengthen the institutions of democratic governance and promote control of military institutions by a democratically elected civilian government.
- (a) International Military Education and Training-
- (1) IN GENERAL- There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary for each of the fiscal years 2010 through 2014 for assistance under chapter 5 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2347 et seq.; relating to international military education and training) for Pakistan, including expanded international military education and training (commonly known as `E-IMET').
- (2) USE OF FUNDS- It is the sense of Congress that a substantial amount of funds made available to carry out this subsection for a fiscal year should be used to pay for courses of study and training in counterinsurgency and civil-military relations.
- (b) Foreign Military Financing Program-
- (1) IN GENERAL- There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary for each of the fiscal years 2010 through 2014 for grant assistance under section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763; relating to the Foreign Military Financing program) for the purchase of defense articles, defense services, and military education and training for Pakistan.
- (2) USE OF FUNDS-
- (A) IN GENERAL- A significant portion of the amount made available to carry out this subsection for a fiscal year shall be for the purchase of defense articles, defense services, and military education and training for activities relating to counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations in Pakistan.
- (B) SENSE OF CONGRESS- It is the sense of Congress that a significant majority of funds made available to carry out this subsection for a fiscal year should be used for the purpose described in subparagraph (A).
- (3) ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY- Except as provided in sections 3 and 102 of the Arms Export Control Act, the second section 620J of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (as added by Public Law 110-161), and any provision of an Act making appropriations for the Department of State, foreign operations, and related programs that restricts assistance to the government of any country whose duly elected head of government is deposed by military coup or decree, and except as otherwise provided in this title, amounts authorized to be made available to carry out paragraph (2) for fiscal years 2010 and 2011 are authorized to be made available notwithstanding any other provision of law.
- (4) DEFINITIONS- In this section, the terms `defense articles', `defense services', and `military education and training' have the meaning given such terms in section 644 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2403).
- (c) Sense of Congress- It is the sense of Congress that the United States should facilitate Pakistan's establishment of a program to provide reconstruction assistance, including through Pakistan's military as appropriate, in areas damaged by combat operations.
- (d) Exchange Program Between Military and Civilian Personnel of Pakistan and Certain Other Countries-
- (1) IN GENERAL- The Secretary of State is authorized to establish an exchange program between--
- (A) military and civilian personnel of Pakistan; and
- (B)(i) military and civilian personnel of countries determined by the Secretary of State to be in the process of consolidating and strengthening a democratic form of government; or
- (ii) military and civilian personnel of North Atlantic Treaty Organization member countries,
- in order to foster greater mutual respect for and understanding of the principle of civilian rule of the military.
- (2) ELEMENTS OF PROGRAM- The program authorized under paragraph (1) may include conferences, seminars, exchanges, and other events, distribution of publications and reimbursements of expenses of foreign military personnel participating in the program, including transportation, translation and administrative expenses.
- (3) ROLE OF NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS- Amounts authorized to be appropriated to carry out this section for a fiscal year are authorized to be made available for nongovernmental organizations to facilitate the implementation of the program authorized under paragraph (1).
- (4) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS- There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary for each of the fiscal years 2010 through 2014 to carry out the program established by this subsection.
- (a) Limitation on Security-related Assistance- For fiscal years 2011 through 2014, no security-related assistance may be provided to Pakistan in a fiscal year until the Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, makes the certification required under subsection (c) for such fiscal year.
- (b) Limitation on Arms Transfers- For fiscal years 2012 through 2014, no letter of offer to sell major defense equipment to Pakistan may be issued pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.) and no license to export major defense equipment to Pakistan may be issued pursuant to such Act in a fiscal year until the Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, makes the certification required under subsection (c) for such fiscal year.
- (c) Certification- The certification required by this subsection is a certification by the Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, to the appropriate congressional committees that--
- (1) the Government of Pakistan is continuing to cooperate with the United States in efforts to dismantle supplier networks relating to the acquisition of nuclear weapons-related materials, such as providing relevant information from or direct access to Pakistani nationals associated with such networks;
- (2) the Government of Pakistan during the preceding fiscal year has demonstrated a sustained commitment to and is making significant efforts towards combating terrorist groups, consistent with the purposes of assistance described in section 201, including taking into account the extent to which the Government of Pakistan has made progress on matters such as--
- (A) ceasing support, including by any elements within the Pakistan military or its intelligence agency, to extremist and terrorist groups, particularly to any group that has conducted attacks against United States or coalition forces in Afghanistan, or against the territory or people of neighboring countries;
- (B) preventing al Qaeda, the Taliban and associated terrorist groups, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, from operating in the territory of Pakistan, including carrying out cross-border attacks into neighboring countries, closing terrorist camps in the FATA, dismantling terrorist bases of operations in other parts of the country, including Quetta and Muridke, and taking action when provided with intelligence about high-level terrorist targets; and
- (C) strengthening counterterrorism and anti-money laundering laws; and
- (3) the security forces of Pakistan are not materially and substantially subverting the political or judicial processes of Pakistan.
- (d) Certain Payments-
- (1) IN GENERAL- Subject to paragraph (2), none of the funds appropriated for security-related assistance for fiscal years 2010 through 2014, or any amounts appropriated to the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund established under the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (Public Law 111-32), may be obligated or expended to make payments relating to--
- (A) the Letter of Offer and Acceptance PK-D-YAD signed between the Governments of the United States of America and Pakistan on September 30, 2006;
- (B) the Letter of Offer and Acceptance PK-D-NAP signed between the Governments of the United States of America and Pakistan on September 30, 2006; and
- (C) the Letter of Offer and Acceptance PK-D-SAF signed between the Governments of the United States of America and Pakistan on September 30, 2006.
- (2) EXCEPTION- Funds appropriated for security-related assistance for fiscal years 2010 through 2014 may be used for construction and related activities carried out pursuant to the Letters of Offer and Acceptance described in paragraph (1).
- (e) Waiver-
- (1) IN GENERAL- The Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, may waive the limitations contained in subsections (a), (b), and (d) for a fiscal year if the Secretary of State determines that is important to the national security interests of the United States to do so.
- (2) PRIOR NOTICE OF WAIVER- The Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, may not exercise the authority of paragraph (1) until 7 days after the Secretary of State provides to the appropriate congressional committees a written notice of the intent to issue to waiver and the reasons therefor. The notice may be submitted in classified or unclassified form, as necessary.
- (f) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined- In this section, the term `appropriate congressional committees' means--
- (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and
- (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
- (a) For Fiscal Year 2010-
- (1) IN GENERAL- For fiscal year 2010, the Department of State's Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund established under the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (Public Law 111-32), hereinafter in this section referred to as the `Fund', shall consist of the following:
- (A) Amounts appropriated to carry out this subsection (which may not include any amounts appropriated to carry out title I of this Act).
- (B) Amounts otherwise available to the Secretary of State to carry out this subsection.
- (2) PURPOSES OF FUND- Amounts in the Fund made available to carry out this subsection for any fiscal year are authorized to be used by the Secretary of State, with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense, to build and maintain the counterinsurgency capability of Pakistan under the same terms and conditions (except as otherwise provided in this subsection) that are applicable to amounts made available under the Fund for fiscal year 2009.
- (3) TRANSFER AUTHORITY-
- (A) IN GENERAL- The Secretary of State is authorized to transfer amounts in the Fund made available to carry out this subsection for any fiscal year to the Department of Defense's Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund established under the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (Public Law 111-32) and such amounts may be transferred back to the Fund if the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, determines that such amounts are not needed for the purposes for which initially transferred.
- (B) TREATMENT OF TRANSFERRED FUNDS- Subject to subsections (d) and (e) of section 203, transfers from the Fund under the authority of subparagraph (A) shall be merged with and be available for the same purposes and for the same time period as amounts in the Department of Defense's Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund.
- (C) RELATION TO OTHER AUTHORITIES- The authority to provide assistance under this subsection is in addition to any other authority to provide assistance to foreign countries.
- (D) NOTIFICATION- The Secretary of State shall, not less than 15 days prior to making transfers from the Fund under subparagraph (A), notify the appropriate congressional committees in writing of the details of any such transfer.
- (b) Submission of Notifications- Any notification required by this section may be submitted in classified or unclassified form, as necessary.
- (c) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined- In this section, the term `appropriate congressional committees' means--
- (1) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and
- (2) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
- (a) Requirements-
- (1) IN GENERAL- For fiscal years 2010 through 2014, any direct cash security-related assistance or non-assistance payments by the United States to the Government of Pakistan may only be provided or made to civilian authorities of a civilian government of Pakistan.
- (2) DOCUMENTATION- For fiscal years 2010 through 2014, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, shall ensure that civilian authorities of a civilian government of Pakistan have received a copy of final documentation provided to the United States related to non-assistance payments provided or made to the Government of Pakistan.
- (b) Waiver-
- (1) SECURITY-RELATED ASSISTANCE- The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, may waive the requirements of subsection (a) with respect to security-related assistance described in subsection (a) funded from accounts within budget function 150 (International Affairs) if the Secretary of State certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the waiver is important to the national security interest of the United States.
- (2) NON-ASSISTANCE PAYMENTS- The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, may waive the requirements of subsection (a) with respect to non-assistance payments described in subsection (a) funded from accounts within budget function 050 (National Defense) if the Secretary of Defense certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the waiver is important to the national security interest of the United States.
- (c) Application to Certain Activities- Nothing in this section shall apply with respect to--
- (1) any activities subject to reporting requirements under title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.);
- (2) any assistance to promote democratic elections or public participation in democratic processes;
- (3) any assistance or payments if the Secretary of State determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that subsequent to the termination of assistance or payments a democratically elected government has taken office;
- (4) any assistance or payments made pursuant to section 1208 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-375; 118 Stat. 2086), as amended;
- (5) any payments made pursuant to the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of Defense of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan; and
- (6) any assistance or payments made pursuant to section 943 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 (Public Law 110-417; 122 Stat. 4578).
- (d) Definitions- In this section--
- (1) the term `appropriate congressional committees' means the Committees on Appropriations, Armed Services, and Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committees on Appropriations, Armed Services, and Foreign Relations of the Senate; and
- (2) the term `civilian government of Pakistan' does not include any government of Pakistan whose duly elected head of government is deposed by military coup or decree.
TITLE III--STRATEGY, ACCOUNTABILITY, MONITORING, AND OTHER PROVISIONS
- (a) Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report- Not later than 45 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report describing United States policy and strategy with respect to assistance to Pakistan under this Act. The report shall include the following:
- (1) A description of the principal objectives of United States assistance to Pakistan to be provided under title I of this Act.
- (2) A general description of the specific programs, projects, and activities designed to achieve the purposes of section 101 and the respective funding levels for such programs, projects, and activities for fiscal years 2010 through 2014.
- (3) A plan for program monitoring, operations research, and impact evaluation research for assistance authorized under title I of this Act.
- (4) A description of the role to be played by Pakistani national, regional, and local officials and members of Pakistani civil society and local private sector, civic, religious, and tribal leaders in helping to identify and implement programs and projects for which assistance is to be provided under this Act, and of consultations with such representatives in developing the strategy.
- (5) A description of the steps taken, or to be taken, to ensure assistance provided under this Act is not awarded to individuals or entities affiliated with terrorist organizations.
- (6) A projection of the levels of assistance to be provided to Pakistan under this Act, broken down into the following categories as described in the annual `Report on the Criteria and Methodology for Determining the Eligibility of Candidate Countries for Millennium Challenge Account Assistance':
- (A) Civil liberties.
- (B) Political rights.
- (C) Voice and accountability.
- (D) Government effectiveness.
- (E) Rule of law.
- (F) Control of corruption.
- (G) Immunization rates.
- (H) Public expenditure on health.
- (I) Girls' primary education completion rate.
- (J) Public expenditure on primary education.
- (K) Natural resource management.
- (L) Business start-up.
- (M) Land rights and access.
- (N) Trade policy.
- (O) Regulatory quality.
- (P) Inflation control.
- (Q) Fiscal policy.
- (7) An analysis for the suitable replacement for existing Pakistani helicopters, including recommendations for sustainment and training.
- (b) Comprehensive Regional Strategy Report-
- (1) SENSE OF CONGRESS- It is the sense of Congress that the achievement of United States national security goals to eliminate terrorist threats and close safe havens in Pakistan requires the development of a comprehensive plan that utilizes all elements of national power, including in coordination and cooperation with other concerned governments, and that it is critical to Pakistan's long-term prosperity and security to strengthen regional relationships among India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.
- (2) COMPREHENSIVE REGIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY- The President shall develop a comprehensive interagency regional security strategy to eliminate terrorist threats and close safe havens in Pakistan, including by working with the Government of Pakistan and other relevant governments and organizations in the region and elsewhere, as appropriate, to best implement effective counterinsurgency and counterterrorism efforts in and near the border areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan, including the FATA, the NWFP, parts of Balochistan, and parts of Punjab.
- (3) REPORT-
- (A) IN GENERAL- Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the comprehensive regional security strategy required under paragraph (2).
- (B) CONTENTS- The report shall include a copy of the comprehensive regional security strategy, including specifications of goals, and proposed timelines and budgets for implementation of the strategy.
- (C) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED- In this paragraph, the term `appropriate congressional committees' means--
- (i) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and
- (ii) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
- (c) Security-related Assistance Plan- Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a plan for the proposed use of amounts authorized for security-related assistance for each of the fiscal years 2010 through 2014. Such plan shall include an assessment of how the use of such amounts complements or otherwise is related to amounts described in section 204.
- (a) Semi-Annual Monitoring Report- Not later than 180 days after the submission of the Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report pursuant to section 301(a), and every 180 days thereafter through September 30, 2014, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that describes the assistance provided under this Act during the preceding 180-day period. The report shall include--
- (1) a description of all assistance by program, project, and activity, as well as by geographic area, provided pursuant to title I of this Act during the period covered by the report, including the amount of assistance provided for each program or project, and with respect to the first report a description of all amounts made available for assistance to Pakistan during fiscal year 2009, including a description of each program, project, and activity for which funds were made available;
- (2) a list of persons or entities from the United States or other countries that have received funds in excess of $100,000 to conduct projects under title I of this Act during the period covered by the report, which may be included in a classified annex, if necessary to avoid a security risk, and a justification for the classification;
- (3) with respect to the plan described in section 301(a)(3), updates to such plan and a description of best practices to improve the impact of the assistance authorized under title I of this Act;
- (4) an assessment of the effectiveness of assistance provided under title I of this Act during the period covered by the report in achieving desired objectives and outcomes as guided by the plan described in section 301(a)(3), and as updated pursuant to paragraph (3) of this subsection, including a systematic, qualitative, and where possible, quantitative basis for assessing whether desired outcomes are achieved and a timeline for completion of each project and program;
- (5) a description of any shortfall in United States financial, physical, technical, or human resources that hinder the effective use and monitoring of such funds;
- (6) a description of any negative impact, including the absorptive capacity of the region for which the resources are intended, of United States bilateral or multilateral assistance and recommendations for modification of funding, if any;
- (7) any incidents or reports of waste, fraud, and abuse of expenditures under title I of this Act;
- (8) the amount of funds authorized to be appropriated pursuant to section 102 that were used during the reporting period for administrative expenses or for audits and program reviews pursuant to the authority under sections 101(c)(2) and 103;
- (9) a description of the expenditures made from any Chief of Mission Fund established pursuant to section 101(c)(5) during the period covered by the report, the purposes for which such expenditures were made, and a list of the recipients of any expenditures from the Chief of Mission Fund in excess of $100,000;
- (10) an accounting of assistance provided to Pakistan under title I of this Act, broken down into the categories set forth in section 301(a)(6);
- (11) an evaluation of efforts undertaken by the Government of Pakistan to--
- (A) disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other extremist and terrorist groups in the FATA and settled areas;
- (B) eliminate the safe havens of such forces in Pakistan;
- (C) close terrorist camps, including those of Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed;
- (D) cease all support for extremist and terrorist groups;
- (E) prevent attacks into neighboring countries;
- (F) increase oversight over curriculum in madrassas, including closing madrassas with direct links to the Taliban or other extremist and terrorist groups; and
- (G) improve counterterrorism financing and anti-money laundering laws, apply for observer status for the Financial Action Task Force, and take steps to adhere to the United Nations International Convention for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism;
- (12) a detailed description of Pakistan's efforts to prevent proliferation of nuclear-related material and expertise;
- (13) an assessment of whether assistance provided to Pakistan has directly or indirectly aided the expansion of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, whether by the diversion of United States assistance or the reallocation of Pakistan's financial resources that would otherwise be spent for programs and activities unrelated to its nuclear weapons program;
- (14) a detailed description of the extent to which funds obligated and expended pursuant to section 202(b) meet the requirements of such section; and
- (15) an assessment of the extent to which the Government of Pakistan exercises effective civilian control of the military, including a description of the extent to which civilian executive leaders and parliament exercise oversight and approval of military budgets, the chain of command, the process of promotion for senior military leaders, civilian involvement in strategic guidance and planning, and military involvement in civil administration.
- (b) Government Accountability Office Reports-
- (1) PAKISTAN ASSISTANCE STRATEGY REPORT- Not later than one year after the submission of the Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report pursuant to section 301(a), the Comptroller General of the United States shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that contains--
- (A) a review of, and comments addressing, the Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report;
- (B) recommendations relating to any additional actions the Comptroller General believes could help improve the efficiency and effectiveness of United States efforts to meet the objectives of this Act;
- (C) a detailed description of the expenditures made by Pakistan pursuant to grant assistance under section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763; relating to the Foreign Military Financing program); and
- (D) an assessment of the impact of the assistance on the security and stability of Pakistan.
- (2) CERTIFICATION REPORT- Not later than 120 days after the date on which the President makes the certification described in section 203(c) for a fiscal year, the Comptroller General of the United States shall conduct an independent analysis of the certification described in such section and shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report containing the results of the independent analysis.
- (c) Submission- The Secretary of State may submit the reports required by this section in conjunction with other reports relating to Pakistan required under other provisions of law, including sections 1116 and 1117 of the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (Public Law 111-32; 123 Stat. 1906 and 1907).
- (d) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined- In this section, the term `appropriate congressional committees' means--
- (1) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and
- (2) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.